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NOTES
United States v. Davis: Extraterritorial Application
of U.S. Drug Laws on the High Seas
I. Introduction
Over the past twenty years Congress has sought to design, pass,
and implement legislation that would effectively reduce the flow of
illicit drugs into the United States.' A major objective of congres-
sional activity in this area has been a broadening of United States
authority to interdict drugs outside American borders. 2 One of the
most successful of these legislative efforts is the Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act (MDLEA).3 The Act specifically provides for extra-
territorial application of United States law on the high seas and
grants the Coast Guard authority to board, search, and seize flagged
vessels of other nations under certain enumerated circumstances. 4
The Act and its predecessor 5 have successfully survived consti-
tutional challenge 6 and in fact have been jurisdictionally broadened
through recent judicial pronouncements. 7 United States v. Davis8 is a
recent example of the movement toward worldwide application of
the MDLEA and is likely to indicate how the Act will be applied in
the future. This Note will examine the historical underpinnings of
the MDLEA, the reasoning of the Davis decision, and the validity of
the court's holding that the protections of the fourth amendment do
not apply to nonresident aliens on the high seas. This Note con-
cludes that while the ultimate result reached in Davis was correct, the
outmoded reasoning of the court and the manner in which it found
I A. ANDERSON, In the Wake of the Dauntless the Background and Development of Maritime
Interdiction Operations, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: WHAT LIES AHEAD? 12 (T. Clingan, Jr. ed.
1986) [hereinafter Interdiction Operations].
2 Id. at 21.
3 46 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1904 (1988).
4 Id. See infra note 54.
5 21 U.S.C. § 955c (1970) (Current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1904 (1988)).
6 United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Romero-
Galue, 757 F.2d 1147 (11th Cir. 1985).
7 See Interdiction Operations, supra note 1, at 35. Additionally in United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S.Ct. 1056 (1990), the Supreme Court held that the protections of
the fourth amendment do not extend to searches and seizures with respect to nonresident
aliens in foreign countries. Id. at 1066.
8 905 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 753 (1991).
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jurisdiction under the MDLEA needlessly left the decision open to
constitutional challenge.
II. History of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act
In the mid-seventies, the domestic consumption of marijuana
and other controlled substances rose dramatically in the United
States.9 Mexico had long been the primary source of marijuana with
the chief supply routes being by land or air directly over the bor-
der.' 0 American and Mexican efforts to control marijuana importa-
tion by tightening security on both sides of the border and by
implementing a U.S.-financed spraying operation in the growing
fields effectively hindered the ability of smugglers to meet the grow-
ing U.S. demand through traditional means."
Smugglers in a number of countries sought to supply the insatia-
ble American drug appetite. Chief among them were the drug lords
of Colombia who enjoyed numerous political, climatic, and geo-
graphical advantages over their drug producing neighbors.' 2
Although marijuana from many nations found its way into the United
States, Colombia eventually emerged as the principal supplier for
U.S. drug dealers.' 3
As Colombian drug production increased, the already limited
airlift capacity of the drug smugglers rapidly became inadequate to
transport the vast quantities of marijuana demanded.14 As a result, it
became increasingly necessary for smugglers to rely on sea-going
vessels for the transport of bulk marijuana to the United States. 15
Thus, the interdiction of these vessels and their cargo before they en-
tered U.S. waters became the focus of congressional anti-drug
efforts. 16
Such interdiction outside of U.S. territorial seas presented a
problem since the customary rule of international law is that "[t]he
high seas are open to all states, and no state may subject any part of
them to its sovereignty."' 17 A corollary to this rule is that apart from a
few limited exceptions, no nation has jurisdiction over foreign ships
on the high seas.' 8 The problem Congress faced was to design U.S.
9 Interdiction Operations, supra note 1, at 12.
10 Id.
I I d.
12 Id. The favorable climate allows the production of two marijuana crops per year.
The growing areas are located in "rugged mountains" which are sparsely populated and
difficult to reach but which have access to "remote beaches." This isolation combined with
the poverty of the region has spawned a "close-knit" smuggling oriented society. Id.
13 Id. at 13.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 14.
16 Id. at 20-21; See also Marijuana on the High Seas Act, 21 U.S.C. § 955a (1970)
(superceded by 46 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1904 (1988)).
17 R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 145 (1983).
18 Id. at 146. See infra note 47.
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drug laws that would accomplish the goals of extraterritorial in-
terdiction yet stay within the accepted norms of international
conduct.
In 1958, the United Nations convened several Conventions on
the Law of the Sea to codify the generally accepted principles of in-
ternational law that had developed as a matter of custom and prac-
tice. 19 The United States has ratified the conventions and is bound
by their terms.20 The only basis provided under the 1958 conven-
tions for exercising jurisdiction for the suppression of illicit drug
traffic is in the case of a vessel located in the territorial seas of the
nation seeking jurisdiction.2 ' Even this limited provision is weak-
ened by the requirement that in order for this jurisdiction to exist
the crime involved must have actually occurred in the territorial sea
of that state. 22
As for the high seas,23 the Convention on the High Seas2 4 pro-
19 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCOLOS-1); Convention on
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1610, T.I.A.S. No.
5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958,
15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 449 U.N.T.S. 311. The 1958 Convention on the High
Seas was adopted by the First United Nations Law of the High Seas Conference. The con-
vention codified international sea law as it had grown up over two centuries. The United
States was a signatory to the convention. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES Vol. 2, Part V, 3-4 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
(REVISED)].
20 RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 19, at 4. In 1982, after years of preparation,
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) completed and
approved a new United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Id. at 4-5. The Conven-
tion as completed did not include several proposals made by the Reagan administration in
1981 regarding deep sea-bed mining. Id. "The final text of the convention was approved
on April 30, 1982, by 130 votes in favor, four against (including the United States) and 17
abstentions." Id. at 5. See United Nations, The Law of The Sea: United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, U.N.Pub. No. E.83.V.5 (1983) (text of 1983 convention).
"However, many provisions of the [new] Convention follow closely provisions in the
1958 conventions to which the United States is a party and which largely restated custom-
ary law as of that time." RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 19, at 5. In 1983, President
Reagan issued a policy statement in which the "United States in effect agreed to accept the
substantive provisions of the Convention, other than those dealing with deep sea-bed min-
ing, in relation to all states that do so with respect to the United States." Id. See 19 WEEKLY
COMP. OF PRES. Docs. 383 (1983), 83 DEP'T STATE BULL., No. 2075, at 70-71 (1983), 22
I.L.M. 464 (1983) (presidential proclamation of 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone
and LOS policy statement). However, generally the four conventions of 1958 "remain the
law of the United States except to the extent they have been superceded." RESTATEMENT
(REVISED), supra note 19, at 6-7.
21 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, art. 19(l)(d), April 29,
1958, 15 U.S.T. 1611, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
22 Id. at art. 19(5).
23 "The high seas lie seaward of the territorial sea and thus encompass the contigu-
ous zone." United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1073, n.6 (5th Cir. 1980). In 1988,
President Reagan proclaimed that the United States territorial sea was extended to 12
miles from United States shores. Proclamation by the President of the United States of America on
the territorial sea of the United States of America, 27 December 1988, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
STATE PRACTICE, No.2, at 83 (1989) (United Nations publication).
24 The actual text of the convention provides:
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vides that a warship which encounters a foreign merchant ship on the
high seas is only justified in boarding her if such boarding is ex-
pressly authorized by an international agreement between the two
nations involved.25 Additionally, a boarding without such agreement
is authorized if there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship
is engaged in piracy; 26 the slave trade;27 or though flying a foreign
flag or no flag, is in reality of the same nationality as the warship.28
To investigate such suspicions, the warship may send a boat
under the command of an officer to the suspected ship.2 9 If suspi-
cion remains after reviewing the ships documents, the officer may
make further examination of the ship.30 If the suspicions turn out to
be unfounded and not due to the fault of the suspect ship, then the
nation of the warship must compensate the merchant ship for any
loss or damage that might have resulted from the boarding.3 '
With these constraints in mind, Congress was faced with the task
of finding a jurisdictional basis to reach drug traffickers on the high
seas. By statutorily expanding the definition of customs waters32 to
provide that an agreement or arrangement with the flag nation could
create constructive customs waters around a foreign vessel on the
high seas, Congress found a solution.33 Once the vessel was deemed
1. Except where acts of interference erive from powers conferred by treaty, a warship
which encounters a foreign merchant ship on the high seas is not justified in
boarding her unless there is a reasonable ground for suspecting:
(a) That the ship is engaged in piracy; or
(b) That the ship is engaged in the slave trade; or
(c) That, though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the
ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship.
2. In the cases provided for in sub-paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) above, the
warship may proceed to verify the ship's right to fly its flag. To this end, it
may send a boat under the command of an officer to the suspected ship. If
suspicion remains after the documents have been checked, it may proceed to
a further examination on board the ship, which must be carried out with all
possible consideration.
3. If the suspicions prove to he unfounded, and provided that the ship
boarded has not committed any act justifying them, it shall be compensated
for any loss or damage that may have been sustained.
Convention on the High Seas, art. 22, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82
(1958)(emphasis added).
25 Id.
26 Id. at art. 22, para. l(a).
27 Id. at art. 22, para. 1(b).
28 Id. at art. 22, para. 1(c).
29 Id. at art. 22, para. 2.
30 Id.
31 Id. at art. 22, para. 3.
32 By statute, the Coast Guard has authority to enforce U.S. laws within the customs
waters of the United States. 19 U.S.C. § 1401(j) (1980). Under current international law, a
nation's contiguous zone may extend up to 12 miles from the territorial sea. This means
that at its maximum, a nations contiguous zone may extend 24 miles from its shores.
Economides, The Contiguous Zone Today and Tomorrow, in THE NEw LAw OF THE SEA 75 (C.
Rozakis and C. Stephanou eds., 1983). Traditionally, a nation's customs waters are encom-
passed within the contiguous zone. Id. at 76-78.
33 19 U.S.C. § 1401(j) (1982) (providing that an agreement or arrangement with the
flag nation can create constructive U.S. customs waters around a foreign vessel on the high
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to be within U.S. customs waters, U.S. drug laws could be enforced
regardless of the vessel's distance from American shores.
While this arm of jurisdiction provided world-wide reach, it was
not inconsistent with principals of international law since it was pred-
icated on the consent of the flag nation to the exercise of jurisdic-
tion. 34 This broad new approach to jurisdiction was first codified in
1980 when Congress enacted the Marijuana on the High Seas Act
(MHSA) 35.
The MHSA was specifically drafted to correct many of the defi-
ciencies and uncertainties which had plagued law enforcement ef-
forts under prior law.36 The MHSA declared it unlawful for: (1) any
person in the customs waters of the United States; (2) anyone who is a
United States citizen on a vessel on the high seas, or aboard a vessel
of the United States; or (3) any person aboard a vessel subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, to intentionally or knowingly manu-
facture, distribute, or possess with intent to distribute, illicit drugs.3 7
The most controversial aspect of the MHSA was a provision ex-
seas without limitation to the U.S. contiguous zone). The actual limiting language of the
statute reads: "the waters within such distance of the coast of the [United States] as the
said authorities are or may be so enabled or permitted by such treaty or arrangement [with
the flag nation]." Id.
The United States has a long history of creatively defining customs waters to combat
smuggling. See Note, Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act: An Analysis, 11 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMp. L. REV. 487, 494-96 (1988).
34 See Note, The Judiciary and Public Policy Considerations of the Marijuana on the High Seas
Act, 10 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 581, 589 n.32 (1986) ("The contractual nature of subsec-
tion (c) of the Marijuana Act saves the Act from violating article 6 of the High Seas Con-
vention or other tenets of international law regarding state sovereignty").
35 Pub. L. No. 96-350, §§ 1-2, 94 Stat. 1159-60 (1980)(codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 955a-
955b (1982); superceded by 46 U.S.C. § 1903 (1988)).
36 Interdictions Operations, supra note 1, at 20. The law preceding the MHSA was the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Control Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1976) [CDAC]. CDAC
was designed to consolidate and modernize the myriad laws governing the importation of
controlled substances. One feature of the 1970 Act was to repeal all prior federal drug
laws including the prior law criminalizing possession aboard United States vessels on the
high seas. The drafters of the CDAC inadvertently neglected to include a new provision in
the 1970 Act recriminalizing possession of drugs on the high seas. Thus, the new Act
resulted in legalization of the possession of controlled substances on United States vessels
anywhere beyond customs waters. Anderson,Jurisdiction Over Stateless Vessels on the High Seas:
An Appraisal Under Domestic and International Law, 13 J. MAR. L. & COM. 323, 324
(1 982)[hereinafter Stateless Vessels].
During the same period, the methods of drug traffickers became more sophisticated.
They began to employ what has become known as the mothership technique. This method
involves the use of large ships carrying drugs that hovered outside U.S. customs waters.
The drugs were loaded on small speed boats (capable of outrunning Coast Guard cutters),
which then made the delivery dash for the American shore. Note, Jurisdiction Over Drug
Smuggling on the High Seas, 44 U. Pirr. L. REV. 1095, 1098. Using this method, only a small
portion of the shipment was at risk of being seized. In addition, since it was not illegal to
possess drugs on vessels hovering outside of U.S. customs waters, even when a speedboat
delivery was interdicted, prosecutors were faced with the difficult task of proving a conspir-
acy to import illicit drugs in order to obtain a conviction. Stateless Vessels at 324.
Finally, the CDAC did not apply to stateless vessels (vessels claiming no nationality),
and this loophole was often used by drug traffickers to evade jurisdiction. Id.
37 21 U.S.C. § 955a(a) (1982) (superceded by 46 U.S.C. § 1903 (1988)).
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tending the jurisdiction of the United States to include stateless ves-
sels.3 8 Several defendants maintained that this provision violated the
long standing international law doctrine mandating freedom of the
high seas.39 However, the courts hearing these challenges deter-
mined that the provision was in consonance with international law as
codified in the 1958 Convention on the High Seas. 40
In 1986 Congress amended the MHSA to form the current Mari-
time Drug Law Enforcement Act.4 ' Essentially, the new Act mirrors
the MHSA42 with a few notable exceptions. The MDLEA provides an
exemption for contract carriers possessing or distributing controlled
substances in the lawful course of their duties. 43 It also sets forth
federal jurisdiction and penalties for violations of the statute.44 The
statute states that,
[t]he Congress finds and declares that trafficking in controlled sub-
stances aboard vessels is a serious international problem and is uni-
versally condemned. Moreover, such trafficking presents a specific
38 See id. at § 955b(d). Stateless vessels are those vessels flying the flag of no nation;
i.e., claiming no nationality. Under general principals of international law, the protections
of the law of the sea are derived from a vessel's connection with a sovereign nation. State-
less vessels are thus not protected and are subject to the jurisdiction of all nations. See
generally Stateless Vessels, supra note 36.
39 See United States v. Smith, 680 F.2d 255, 258 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1110 (1983); United States v. Cortes, 588 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1979).
40 See Smith, 680 F.2d at 258; Cortes, 588 F.2d at 110.
41 46 U.S.C. § 1903(a) (1988) provides:
Manufacture, distribution, or possession with intent to manufacture or dis-
tribute controlled substances on board vessels.
(a) Vessels of United States or vessels subject to jurisdiction of United
States. It is unlawful for any person on board a vessel of the United
States, or who is a citizen of the United States or a resident alien of
the United States on board any vessel, to knowingly or intentionally
manufacture or distribute, or to possess with intent to manufacture
or distribute, a controlled substance.
Id. at § 1903(a).
42 Id. §§ 1903 (a-c). This section falls under the chapter entitled "Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement."
43 Id. at § 1903(e). The paragraph reads:
Exceptions; burden of proof. This section does not apply to a common
or contract carrier or an employee thereof, who possesses or distributes a
controlled substance in the lawful and usual course of the carrier's business
or to a public vessel of the United States, or any person on board such vessel
who possesses or distributes a controlled substance in the lawful course of
such person's duties, if the controlled substance is part of the cargo entered
in the vessels manifest and is intended to be lawfully imported into the coun-
try of destination for scientific, medical, or other legitimate purposes. It shall
not be necessary for the United States to negative the exception set forth in
this subsection in any complaint, information, indictment, or other pleading
or in any trial or other proceeding. The burden of going forward with the
evidence with respect to this exception is upon the person claiming its
benefit.
Id.
44 Id. "Any person who violates this subsection will be tried in the United States dis-
trict court at the point of entry where the person enters the United States, or in the United
States District Court of the District of Columbia." Id.
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threat to the security and societal well-being of the United States.
4 5
This language is significant because it provides a basis for universal
jurisdiction over suspected drug traffickers similar to that historically
recognized over pirates and slave runners.46 While such jurisdiction
has not yet become generally accepted, 47 there are clear indications
that the world community may be moving in that direction. 48
An interesting provision of the MDLEA that deserves mention is
found in section 1903(d). This section provides that the right to chal-
lenge jurisdiction based on a failure to comply with international law
resides solely in the flag state of the vessel concerned. 49 A failure to
comply with international law will not divest a court ofjurisdiction or
otherwise constitute a defense to an action under the MDLEA. 50
Congress added this amendment because, under the MHSA, some
defendants had successfully resisted prosecution by "relying heavily
on international jurisdictional questions as legal technicalities." 5'
While discussion of this provision is beyond the scope of this Note, it
has been the subject of criticism on due process grounds. 52
The MDLEA also expanded the jurisdiction of U.S. law over that
45 46 U.S.C. § 1902.
46 Piracy and the slave trade have sometimes been described as offenses against the
law of nations- international crimes. Under customary international law, the punishment
of these crimes has been allowed to any nation that seizes the offender based on the ab-
sence of any "international penal tribunal." RESTATEMENT (REvISED), supra note 19, § 404,
reporter's note 1.
47 Id. § 404. "A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain
offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy,
slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes and perhaps certain
acts of terrorism .... Drug trafficking, while "universally condemned," has not generally
been classified with the above listed offenses so as to provide universal jurisdiction. Id.
§ 522, reporter's note 8.
48 See Comment, Drug Trafficking on the High Seas: A Move Toward Universal Jurisdiction
Under International Law, 4 EMORY INT'l. L. REV. 207 (1990).
49 46 U.S.C. § 1903(d).
50 Id. This addition appears to be a codification of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. Riesen-
feld, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Flag Vessels and the U.S. Courts: Adrift Without a Compass?, 10
MIH. J. INT'L L., 241, 250 (1989).
The general gist of the doctrine is that a court that obtains jurisdiction over a defend-
ant as the result of an illegal abduction does not lose that jurisdiction based on due pro-
cess grounds. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 440 (1886)(jurisdiction over person
resulting from forced abduction from foreign country does not offend due process); Fris-
bie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952)(jurisdiction of state court over person resulting
from kidnapping in violation of federal statute is not invalidated by due process
requirements).
51 S. REP. No. 530, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5986, 6000. This section of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act reads:
A claim of failure to comply with international law in enforcement of this
chapter may be invoked solely by a foreign nation, and a failure to comply
with international law will not divest a court ofjurisdiction or otherwise con-
stitute a defense to any proceeding under this chapter.
46 U.S.C. § 1903(d).
52 See Note, Survey of United States Jurisdiction Over High Seas Narcotics Trafficking, 19 GA.
J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 119 (1989); Note, Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act: An Analysis, 11
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 487 (1988).
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The MDLEA also expanded the jurisdiction of U.S. law over that
found in the MHSA.5 3 Section 1903(c)(1)(C) defines a vessel subject
to U.S. jurisdiction to include not only stateless, American, and for-
eign vessels within the customs waters of the United States, but also
foreign flagged vessels on the high seas when the flag state consents
or waives objection to enforcement jurisdiction. 54 This consent or
waiver may be transmitted by any reasonable means including by ra-
dio or telephone transmission. 55 The addition of this section was sig-
nificant because it removed the requirement for creating
constructive customs waters upon which to predicate jurisdiction.
The MDLEA also omitted the MHSA's reference to customs waters
as defined in 19 U.S.C. § 1401 (j) which had provided that U.S. cus-
toms waters could be deemed to encompass a foreign vessel upon
the consent of the flag nation. Thus, under the MDLEA the archaic
constructive customs waters approach to jurisdiction should have
been dead. In its application of the MDLEA however, the Davis court
ignored the language of the MDLEA and maintained the old ap-
proach. While jurisdiction was alternatively available under section
1903(c)(1)(C), the Davis court's error was not completely harmless
in light of the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez,56 that the protections of the United States Constitution do
not apply to foreign nationals outside the United States.
57
IIl. Statement of the Case
In June of 1987, the fifty-eight foot sailing vessel, The Myth of
Ecurie (the Myth), was sailing in the Pacific Ocean, having departed
53 See generally Note, Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act: An Analysis, 11 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMp. L. REV. 487 (1988).
54 46 U.S.C. § 1903(c)(1)(C). The pertinent portion of the statute reads:
(1) For purposes of this section, a "vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States" includes-
(A) a vessel without nationality;
(B) a vessel assimilated to a vessel without nationality, in accordance
with paragraph (2) of article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the High
Seas;
(C) a vessel registered in a foreign nation where the flag nation has
consented or waived objection to the enforcement of United States
law by the United States;
(D) a vessel located within the customs waters of the United States; and
(E) a vessel located in the territorial waters of another nation, where
the nation consents to the enforcement of United States law by the
United States.
Consent or waiver of objection by a foreign nation to the enforcement of
United States law by the United States under subparagraph (C) or (E) of this
paragraph may be obtained by radio, telephone, or similar oral or electronic
means, and may be proved by certification of the Secretary of State or the
Secretary's designee.
Id. § 1903(c)(1).
55 Id. § 1903(c)(1)(E).
56 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
57 Id. Verdugo-Urquidez is discussed in detail infra.
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from Hong Kong. 58 At a point about thirty-five nautical miles from
Point Reyes, California, the United States Coast Guard cutter Cape
Romain encountered the Myth, and Coast Guard personnel requested
permission via radio to board. 59 Peter Davis (who is not a U.S. citi-
zen), the captain of the Myth, denied the request stating that the
Coast Guard had no authority to board his boat because it was of
British registry and was sailing on the high seas. 60 Davis then an-
nounced his intention to alter his course for the Caribbean. 6 t
The Coast Guard had a number of reasons to suspect that the
Myth was carrying illicit drugs bound for the United States.62 Accord-
ingly, the Coast Guard requested permission from the United King-
dom to board the ship, apparently pursuant to a 1981 agreement
between the two countries regarding the suppression of illegal im-
portation of narcotic drugs into the United States. 63 In its reply by
telex, the United Kingdom responded that it had no objection to the
boarding, search, and seizure of the vessel by the United States
under the terms of the 1981 agreement.64
Thus, with the U.K.'s approval, Coast Guard crew members
boarded the vessel which by this time had sailed to a location ap-
proximately 100 miles west of the California coast. 65 The boarding
officer detected an odor of marijuana in the cabin of the Myth.66 Da-
vis and a Coast Guard officer then proceeded to the vessel's lower
decks to obtain a shotgun that Davis reported to be aboard.6 7 In
plain view, the officer saw numerous "bales," and once again smelled
marijuana. When asked about the contents of the bales, Davis admit-
58 Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 247 (9th Cir. 1990).
59 Id.
GO Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. The Myth was included on a list of vessels the Coast Guard's El Paso Intelli-
gence Center suspected of drug smuggling; the Myth was also sailing in an area in which
sailing vessels were infrequently found, was riding low in the water indicating that it was
carrying cargo, and acted suspiciously in attempting to change course upon encountering
the Coast Guard. d. at 250.
63 Agreement to Facilitate the Interdiction by the United States of Vessels of the
United Kingdom Suspected of Trafficking in Drugs, Nov. 13, 1981, United Kingdom-
United States, 33 U.S.T. 4224, T.I.A.S. No. 10,296 [hereinafter 1981 Agreement].
64 905 F.2d 245, 250 (9th Cir. 1990). The actual text of the telex stated:
1. HMG has verified registry of subj vessel and has authorized USG to
board, search and seize, if evidence warrents [sic], under U.S. Law. HMG
has indicated that the conditions and terms contained in 13 Nov 81
US/UK Agreemnt [sic] will be used in this case.
2. In view of the above, comdt has no objection to taking action against subj
vessel under the terms of the US/UK Agreement.
3. Insure Amenbassy [sic] London is info addee on all related msc traffic.
United States v. Biermann, 678 F. Supp. 1437, 1442 n. 2 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (This is Davis in
the district court).
65 Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 247 (9th Cir. 1990).
66 Id.
67 Id.
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ted they were marijuana. 68 The vessel, its 7000 pounds of marijuana,
and crew were then placed under arrest and taken to the local Cali-
fornia Coast Guard station.69
In September of 1987, Davis filed a motion to dismiss the
charges against him based on lack of jurisdiction. Additionally, he
made a motion to suppress any evidence seized from the Myth. 70 The
district court denied both motions. In July of 1988, the district court
found Davis guilty on stipulated facts. 7 1 Davis appealed this verdict
to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on two grounds: first, that the
provisions MDLEA under which he was convicted do not apply to
persons on foreign vessels outside the territory of the United States;
and second, that the search of the Myth violated the fourth
amendment.72
The Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress had the power to
give the MDLEA extraterritorial application so long as the intent to
do so was clearly stated in the language of the statute.73 Additionally,
as a matter of constitutional law, the court held that the statute must
be applied in a manner that does not offend the due process clause
of the fifth amendment.74 In the case of the MDLEA, Congress ex-
plicitly stated that the statute was to be given extraterritorial effect. 75
Thus, the court identified the question of due process as the only
statutory question to be addressed.76
The court reasoned that due process required there exist a suffi-
cient nexus between the defendant and the United States for a fed-
eral criminal statute to be applied extraterritorially. 77 In this case,
the court found the nexus to exist in what is called the protective
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 247, 251.
73 Id. at 248.
74 Id. at 248-49. More specifically, there must be sufficient nexus so that application
of the statute would not be "arbitrary or fundamentally unfair." Id. at 249.
In a footnote to the decision, the court reviewed previous decisions where interna-
tional law principles ofjurisdiction had been discussed simultaneously with Congressional
exercise of legislative jurisdiction. Id. at 249, n.2. The court noted that while,
International law principles may be useful as a rough guide of whether a
sufficient nexus exists between the defendant and the United States so that
application of the statute in question would not violate due process . . . [the]
danger exists that emphasis on international law principles will cause us to
lose sight of the ultimate question: would application of the statute to the
defendant be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair?
ld.
75 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(h) (1988). The paragraph reads: "This section is intended
to reach acts of possession, manufacture, or distribution committed outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States." Id.
76 Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1990).
77 Id. at 248-49.
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principle of international jurisdiction, 7 8 i.e., " [w]here an attempted
transaction is aimed at causing criminal acts within the United States,
there is sufficient basis for the United States to exercise its jurisdic-
tion."' 79 The court then set forth an extensive list of factors that
tended to demonstrate that the Myth's cargo was headed for the
United States, providing the necessary jurisdictional basis.8 0
The next step in the court's analysis was to determine whether
the MDLEA by its terms applied to Davis' conduct.8 ' The court held
that section 1903(c)(1)(D) provided jurisdiction over vessels in the
"customs waters" of the United States.8 2 In the case of a foreign
vessel, customs waters include any waters where the flag government
has by treaty or some other arrangement enabled or permitted the
United States to enforce upon such vessels the laws of the United
States. 83 A foreign vessel may be deemed to be in the customs waters
of the United States practically anywhere in the world subject to the
limitations of the agreement or arrangement between the flag nation
and the United States.
In Davis, the court did not rely upon the standing 1981 agree-
ment between the United States and the United Kingdom to provide
the basis for its jurisdiction.8 4 Instead, the court premised jurisdic-
78 While the court did not specifically use the terminology 'protective principle' in the
body of its opinion, this was clearly the doctrinal justification for finding a sufficient nexus.
See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
79 United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 493 (9th Cir. 1987). The court in Peterson
clearly relied upon the international protective principle concept citing the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 33 for the proposition that "Protective jurisdiction is
proper if the activity threatens the security or governmental functions of the United States.
Drug trafficking presents the sort of threat to our nation' ability to function that merits
application of the protective principle of jurisdiction." Peterson, 812 F.2d at 494.
80 At the time the Myth was first detected, it was only 35 miles from the U.S. coast
headed on a course for San Francisco. In addition, once the Myth was challenged by the
Coast Guard, it changed course. The Myth had also been identified by intelligence sources
as a likely drug smuggler. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1990) (See United States v.
Biermann, 678 F. Supp. 1437 (N.D. Cal. 1988) for additional factual details).
81 Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1990).
82 Two definitions of customs waters are involved in this case. The conventional view
is that they are those waters within 24 miles of the coast of the United States. See supra note
32. Congress has also provided for the creation of constructive customs waters. See supra
note 33.
83 Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1990)(citing 19 U.S.C. § 140 1(j) (1982)). While
the court did not spell out its holding in language this broad, the practical effect of an
arrangement with a foreign government to board one of its vessels is to extend U.S. cus-
toms waters to anywhere the vessel is located regardless of the distance from U.S. shores.
84 In Biernann, the district court denied a motion made by Davis and his co-defend-
ants to dismiss the case against them based on lack ofjurisdiction. The district court found
that the United States had jurisdiction under subsections (C) and (D) of section 1903(c)(1).
678 F. Supp. at 1441, 1443. Subsection (D) is the "customs waters" basis adopted by the
Davis court. Subsection (C) is a provision for jurisdiction where the flag nation has con-
sented or waived jurisdiction under United States law. See supra note 54. The Biermnann
court held that subsection (C) was satisfied by the 1981 agreement even though the agree-
ment by its terms did not appear to apply to the Pacific Ocean. Biermann, 678 F. Supp. at
1442. The court reasoned that the telexed consent allowing search and seizure pursuant to
N.CJ. INI'L L. & Com. REG. [VOL. 16
tion on the telexed consent received in response to the Coast Guard
request to board. 85 Judge Wiggins noted that "[a]s long as the for-
eign government has made clear its indication of consent, the ar-
rangement necessary to create customs waters around a specific
vessel may be informal." 86 Accordingly, the court found that the
United Kingdom's reply constituted an arrangement pursuant to 19
U.S.C. § 1401(j)87 and that Davis was therefore in the customs wa-
ters of the United States, and hence within its jurisdiction.88
Finally, the court disposed of Davis' claims that the search of the
Myth was conducted in violation of the fourth amendment. Without
reaching the constitutional merits of Davis' claim, the court cited the
Supreme Court's recent ruling in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez as
controlling. 89 In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court had held that the fourth
amendment did not apply to searches and seizures of nonresident
aliens in foreign countries. 90 The Davis court stated that the analysis
and language of the Verdugo-Urquidez opinion did not create an excep-
tion for the searches of nonresident aliens on the high seas. 9 ' Thus,
the protections of the fourth amendment did not apply to Davis. 92
Accordingly, Davis' convictions were affirmed. 93
IV. Significance of the Davis Decision
In Davis, for the first time, a Federal Circuit Court held that the
protections of the fourth amendment do not apply to nonresident
the agreement constituted a waiver of objection to a U.S. assertion of jurisdiction. Id. See
also supra note 65.
85 Instead of holding that the telexed consent fulfilled the jurisdictional requirement
of section 1903(c)(1)(C) by providing consent or waiving objection to jurisdiction, the
court takes the multistep approach holding that the telexed consent fulfills the "customs
waters" requirements as set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1401(j) (1982), thus finding jurisdiction
under section 1903(c)(1)(D). Why the court opts for the fiction of constructive customs
waters is unclear.
86 Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 250 (9th Cir. 1990).
87 This section further defines customs waters as:
The term 'customs waters' means, in the case of a foreign vessel subject to a
treaty or some other arrangement between a foreign government and the
United States enabling or permitting the authorities of the United States to
board, examine, search, seize, or to enforce upon such vessel upon the high
seas the laws of the United States, the waters within such distance of the coast
of the United States as the said authorities are or may be so enabled or per-
mitted by such treaty or arrangement.
U.S.C. § 1401(j)(1982).
The effect of this definition is to allow the creation of constructive customs waters
anywhere in the world.
88 Davis, 905 F.2d at 250. It is the use of this outdated constructive customs waters
approach which is the main criticism of this Note.
89 110 S.Ct. 1056 (1990).
90 Id. at 1061.
91 905 F.2d at 251.
92 Id.
93 Id.
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aliens on the high seas. 94 This holding was contrary to the historical
assumption that the amendment applied wherever United States
agents sought to apply United States law to foreign nationals. 95
Nonetheless, in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Verdugo-Ur-
quidez,9 6 the inapplicability of the fourth amendment to nonresident
aliens on the high seas appears to follow logically. However, the
"customs waters" reasoning used by the court to find jurisdiction in
Davis may provide a distinction that would support fourth amend-
ment application. 97 -
Instead of relying on the provision of the MDLEA that allows
United States jurisdiction over a foreign flag vessel based simply on
an arrangement with or the consent of9 8 the flag nation, the court
fell back on the old pre-MDLEA concept of constructive customs wa-
ters jurisdiction. 99 Thus, instead of taking the one step road tojuris-
94 The previous assumption was that the protections of the fourth amendment did
apply on the high seas. See United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 489 (previously as-
suming without deciding that the fourth amendment protections apply on the high seas).
95 In his dissent in Verdugo-Urquidez, Justice Brennan quoted Bill of Rights architect
James Madison for the proposition that:
[I]t does not follow, because aliens are not parties to the Constitution, as
citizens are parties to it, that, whilst they actually conform to it, they have no
right to its protection. Aliens are no more parties to the laws than they are
parties to the Constitution; yet it will not be disputed that, as they owe, on
one hand a temporary obedience, they are entitled, in return, to their protec-
tion and advantage.
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S.Ct. 1056, 1071 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing)(citing Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions (1800), reprinted in 4 ELLIOT's DE1BATES
556 (2d ed. 1836).
96 The Davis court started with the concept that the high seas are outside of U.S.
territory. 903 F.2d at 251. Since the Supreme Court had ruled that the fourth amendment
does not apply to searches and seizures of nonresident aliens outside U.S. territory (see
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S.Ct. 1056 (1990)), the Myth, being located on the
high seas, was not subject to fourth amendment protection. Id.
97 The gist of the distinction this Note makes is that 'constructive' customs waters
may be sufficiently analogous to territory of the U.S. to distinguish such waters from the
high seas, the contiguous zone, or traditional customs waters.
98 46 U.S.C. § 1903(c)(1)(C). See also supra note 54.
99 The predecessor statute to the MDLEA was the Marijuana on the High Seas Act
(MHSA), 21 U.S.C. § 955(a) (1980). Under the MHSA, a "vessel subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States" included U.S. flag vessels, foreign vessels in U.S. territorial waters,
stateless vessels, and most significantly for our purposes, vessels in the customs waters of
the United States. Id. Notably missing is the clause found in section 1903(c)(1)(C) of the
MDLEA, providing jurisdiction over foreign vessels based on an arrangement with or con-
sent of the flag nation.
The functional reach of the two statutes is the same because the MHSA definition of
customs waters was based on 19 U.S.C. § 1401(j) (1982), which provided that customs
waters could be created by an arrangement with or consent of the flag nation. Thus, under
both statutes, consent or an arrangement could provide jurisdiction. However, the
MDLEA does so without relying on the fiction that the waters around the subject vessel are
customs waters.
The MDLEA's retention ofjurisdiction within the traditional U.S. customs waters is
still important when a vessel of another nation is suspected of trafficking drugs within the
contiguous waters of the United States but the flag nation will not consent to allowing
jurisdiction. See Note, Survey of United StatesJurisdiction Over High Seas Narcotics Trafficking, 19
GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 119, 136-39 (1989).
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
diction under section 1903(c)(1)(C) which allows informal consent of
the flag nation to provide jurisdiction, the court took a multi-step
approach under section 1903(c)(1)(D).
The court found that an "arrangement" existed between the
United Kingdom and the United States.' 00 This arrangement was
sufficient to meet the requirements of 19 U.S.C. § 1401(j) which al-
lows the creation of constructive United States customs waters
around the vessel.' 0 ' Under 14 U.S.C. § 89(a), "[t]he Coast Guard
may make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures,
and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United
States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection and suppression
of violations of the laws of the United States."' 02 Since the customs
waters of the United States are within United States jurisdiction, the
Myth was subject to search and seizure.10 3
The problem with the court's approach is that the constructive
placement of the Myth inside United States customs waters arguably
places it within the protective sphere of the fourth amendment even
after Verdugo-Urquidez. Whether Verdugo-Urquidez, which only ad-
dressed fourth amendment application in foreign countries, can be
logically extended to waters where the United States is claiming (al-
beit constructively) customs enforcement rights is unclear.
The Court expressly stated in Verdugo-Urquidez that it was not
ruling on whether the fourth amendment applied to nonresident
aliens subjected to search in the United States, but instead whether
the fourth amendment applied to nonresident aliens subjected to
search in foreign countries.' 0 4 The Court distinguished the situation
of illegal aliens by reasoning that they are in the United States volun-
tarily and presumably have accepted some societal obligations, while
the respondent who was in the United States against his will had ac-
cepted none. '0 5
The Davis court extrapolated from Verdugo-Urquidez that the pro-
tections of the fourth amendment do not extend to searches of non-
resident aliens on the high seas, and thus Davis had no standing to
raise a fourth amendment challenge.' 0 6 While the court's equating
100 Davis, 905 F.2d at 250 (telex of consent to board vessel pursuant to 1981 agree-
ment constitutes an arrangement).
101 Id. at 249-50. This definition of customs waters while specifically referenced in the
MHSA was not retained in the MDLEA. Nevertheless, the court adopts it anyway.
102 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1988).
103 Davis, 905 F.2d at 250.
104 In Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S.Ct. 1056 (1990), the Court specifically declined to rule
on the validity of a fourth amendment claim that might be brought by illegal aliens who are
subject to search and seizure inside the United States. Id. at 1065.
105 Id. The Court also noted that in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza it had assumed that the
fourth amendment did apply to illegal aliens in the United States. Id. at 1064 (citing INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984)).
106 Davis, 905 F.2d at 251.
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of searches in foreign countries to those on the high seas may be rea-
sonable, it is not dispositive of the search in Davis which by the
court's own analysis occurred in "constructive" U.S. customs waters.'
0 7
In United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, the Supreme Court as-
sumed that the fourth amendment applied "in the United States or
within the customs waters."10 8 The customs waters in Villamonte-Mar-
quez consisted of a shipping channel connecting the Gulf of Mexico
with Lake Charles, Louisiana which was a customs point of entry.' 0 9
While the customs waters in Villamonte-Marquez are distinguishable in
their proximity to the United States from those constructively cre-
ated in Davis, it is by no means clear that they do not enjoy the same
fourth amendment protections."I 0 The court could have avoided any
reasonable question of fourth amendment applicability by finding ju-
risdiction under section 1903(c)(1)(C) of the MDLEA."'I
Section 1903(c)(1)(C) provides jurisdiction under exactly the
same conditions of flag nation consent1 2 as the constructive cus-
toms waters approach actually used by the court. Therefore, logically
section 1903(c)(1)(D) (providing for customs waters jurisdiction)
should be reserved for vessels actually in the traditional customs wa-
ters of the U.S., and not used to obtain jurisdiction over a foreign
flag vessel on the high seas based on flag nation consent. In such a
case, jurisdiction should be found exclusively under the consent pro-
visions of section 1903(c)(1)(C). This position is strengthened by the
fact that the MDLEA does not retain the reference to the definition
of constructive customs waters found in the MHSA.' '
3
The advantage to using section 1903(c)(1)(C) is that it avoids
the attendant baggage that may accompany a finding that a vessel is
within U.S. customs waters. In fact, the addition of the section upon
the creation of the MDLEA makes little sense if Congress had in-
tended for the outdated jurisdiction by "customs waters" approach
to be used when the flag government had met the consent require-
ment under section 1903(c)(1)(C). While the Supreme Court may
107 Id. at 250.
108 462 U.S. 579, 585 (1983).
109 Id. at 582.
110 Some courts have held that conventional customs waters are the functional
equivalents of national borders. See United States v. Stanley, 545 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 917 (1977); United States v. Hidalgo-Gato, 703 F.2d 1267 (11 th Cir.
1983). While this is significant as to border search warrant requirements, it is not disposi-
tive of the question as to whether the fourth amendment applies to 'constructive' customs
waters far from U.S. shores.
I I I Jurisdiction would have been obtained over the defendant on the high seas without
any pretense of creating customs waters around his vessel located 100 miles off the U.S.
coast.
112 Countries that have provided consent for drug interdiction actions include the
United Kingdom, the Bahamas, Colombia, Haiti, Panama, France, Spain, Jamaica, Den-
mark, Venezuela, Honduras, and Canada. See Interdiction Operations, supra note 1, at 36.
1 13 The reference to the definition of customs waters under the MHSA is found at 21
U.S.C. § 955b(a). No such reference is found in the MDLEA.
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clarify on a future occasion the applicability of the fourth amend-
ment to nonresident aliens on vessels in the constructive customs
waters of the United States, there is little sense in using a legal fiction
subject to a fourth amendment attack when a clear statutory alterna-
tive is available.
V. Conclusion
United States v. Davis is an ideal case for illustrating the applica-
tion of the MDLEA. In the MDLEA Congress has fashioned a statu-
tory scheme for obtaining extraterritorial jurisdiction over drug
smugglers while remaining within the acceptable bounds of interna-
tional law. Davis is also the first case applying the MDLEA since the
Supreme Court's ruling in Verdugo-Urquidez. The court in Davis cor-
rectly read Verdugo-Urquidez to stand for the proposition that searches
of nonresident aliens on the high seas are unprotected by the re-
quirements of the fourth amendment.
Had the court found jurisdiction under the simple consent pro-
visions of section 1903(c)(1)(C), then Davis would have been located
only on the high seas and in light of Verdugo-Urquidez, not entitled to
fourth amendment protection. However, the court erroneously
based jurisdiction on the old MHSA constructive customs waters def-
inition; a definition omitted under the current MDLEA. Thus the
question arises, does the fourth amendment apply to United States
customs waters. As noted, there is some authority suggesting it does.
By misapplying of the jurisdictional provisions of the MDLEA,
the Davis court needlessly left the search and seizure of the Myth
open to fourth amendment challenge. Congress has eliminated the
need for the fiction of constructive customs waters jurisdiction. In
light of Verdugo-Urquidez, the federal circuit should recognize and
make use of the change.
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